DISCLAIMER
This editorial opinion of OROMIA TODAY has been formulated in consultation with opinion influencers.
What Just Happened?
Reportedly, delegates representing a broad spectrum of political, civic, and faith-based organizations—16 in total, as stated—convened to deliberate on the political and security situation in Oromia. While the stated purpose was to discuss these pressing issues, the manner and context of the meeting hint at deeper, less transparent motives lurking behind this ostensibly routine gathering.
Who Instigated This Meeting?
Quite simply, it was the Prosperity Party (PP) regime itself that orchestrated this meeting. In a state where freedom of speech and assembly is severely curtailed, the fact that leaders from two major Oromo parties—specifically, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC)—could even consider engaging in a telephone conversation is, in itself, an impossibility under the prevailing security apparatus. In this environment, where spontaneous interactions among such key figures are not only discouraged but practically unthinkable, the presence of delegations from 16 separate organizations cannot be attributed to any organic, voluntary initiative. Rather, it is a clear indication that the meeting was engineered by the regime.
What Instigated the Meeting?
The catalyst for this contrived assembly is the mounting pressure being exerted by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) on the regime. In an almost sarcastic twist, the regime finds itself compelled to act in response to the influence and assertiveness of OLA. The message is unambiguous: the pressure exerted by OLA has forced the regime’s hand, leaving it with little alternative but to stage a meeting—even if the context and logistics of such an event remain highly suspect.
Well done OLA! Keep up the pressure, and thank you for the sacrifices you make every minute, every hour, and every day.
Galannike Biliisummaa Haata’u!
What Is the Purpose of the Meeting?
This should be obvious from the preceding answer. When one considers the inherent nature of the regime—a state where free speech and open assembly are systematically suppressed—its facilitation of a meeting among various Oromo organizations appears paradoxical. However, the regime’s true motives become evident when viewed through the lens of recent experiences and the longstanding repressive character of the century-old Ethiopian empire state.
The underlying purpose is transparently a maneuver to coerce the Oromo Liberation Army into submission. Despite repeated attempts by the regime to suppress OLA, including two highly contentious negotiation sessions in Tanzania that proved futile, the organization remains resilient. This meeting, therefore, represents yet another calculated effort by the regime to keep trying its luck again and again. The regime’s longstanding track record of deception and its consistent failure to earn genuine trust serve as a stark warning against taking its overtures at face value.
Who Truly Holds the Right to Shape the Outcome?
The talks emerged from OLA’s strength, yet the framing of the communiqué reveals how those who did not fight a battle position themselves to claim credit and control its outcome.
Not only does OLA command strength at this point, but it also had the foresight from the outset to see through the deception of disarmament and continue the armed struggle by splitting off OLF. It should be noted that the OLF proper disowned the OLA in 2019 and registered as a political party, though it was unable to participate in the June 2021 election due to member killings, imprisonments, and office closures by the PP regime.
- These factors strongly suggest that OLA holds full prerogative in this matter, and other stakeholders should respect that.
- Why the rush to propose such a roadmap without even consulting OLA? Or, are they going to join the PP regime, just like the splinter group, the “Hilton OLF“, did in 2019.
- The OLF and OFC, acting opportunistically, are complicit in this political maneuver, exploiting OLA’s sacrifices while relegating them to a mere security function instead of granting real political influence.
- OLA’s sidelining reflects what is often described as “Post-Conflict Marginalization,” where armed groups are pressured into security roles while being denied full political agency. This cannot and should not be allowed to happen—immediate corrective action is essential.
- The above points assume that OLF and OFC did not act under undue duress of the PP regime, though this possibility cannot be ruled out until confirmed one way or the other. We say this because it is quite astonishing that OLA exerted pressure on the PP regime and instigated this very meeting, while OLF and OFC, seemingly emerging from a sleepy valley, swiftly embraced the idea of forming a transitional government and more.
- If the PP regime’s intent is to create confusion—as usual, with plausible deniability—then good luck navigating their own slippery slope. It will only backfire and worsen their predicament.
Are the Delegates—Excluding the Two Major Parties—Genuine at All?
A regime built on deception can never produce anything authentic. It quickly became evident that most of the so-called delegates, including some from defunct groups, were handpicked by the regime. According to OLA’s communiqué, even military and security personnel were embedded as delegates.
One glaring omission raises further suspicion—why was there no delegation representing Islam within the faith group? Given the PP regime’s well-documented modus operandi, such an exclusion may not be accidental but a deliberate ploy to sow division among Oromos. However, Oromos must outthink the regime and see through its crude, desperate tactics to cling to power.
Most importantly, orchestrating the entire process from the outset, then handpicking participants, embedding its own personnel, and potentially dictating the final outcome, the credibility of the entire undertaking is deeply compromised. Rather than serving as a platform for genuine dialogue or resolution, this carefully curated setup transforms the entire exercise into a mere political charade, devoid of authenticity or legitimacy.
As a result, any published communiqué emerging from this process carries little to no weight and cannot be taken seriously. When the outcome is predetermined by those in power, it ceases to be a reflection of diverse perspectives or meaningful consensus. Instead, it becomes a hollow proclamation, designed to serve the interests of the regime rather than address the realities on the ground.
What Is the Way Forward?
Looking ahead, the regime faces an uphill battle in repairing its severely tarnished reputation. With a legacy of “zero trust” that spans numerous failed initiatives, the road to regaining even a modicum of credibility is long and arduous. There may well be a thousand—and perhaps even more—measures required before the regime could conceivably earn the trust necessary to convene such a meeting in a manner that is both genuine and democratic. The prerequisites outlined in the following section, though not necessarily exhaustive or presented in a specific order, serve as a stark reminder of the extensive reforms and fundamental changes essential for any future progress.
Essential Pillars for Authentic Trust
The PP regime can enhance its credibility by implementing the following measures through legislation, reforms, resolutions, or a combination thereof, as appropriate. It is important to recognize that the incumbent government cannot absolve itself of historical injustices even not directly committed by itself; rather, it has a crucial responsibility to address them in order to foster reconciliation, national unity, and social healing.
As informational pointers for our readers, we outline the general approaches an incumbent government can utilize in addressing historical injustices:
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Legislative Measures
- Passing resolutions that formally acknowledge wrongful acts and their lasting impact.
- Making commitments to non-repetition to ensure history does not repeat itself.
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Commemorative Actions
- Declaring an official day of remembrance to keep historical injustices in public consciousness.
- Establishing memorial markers and monuments to serve as reminders of past atrocities while reinforcing the importance of human rights.
- Integrating educational programs into school curricula and developing interactive museums to educate future generations.
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Material Reparations
- Providing financial compensation to victims or their descendants.
- Implementing land restitution programs where property was unjustly seized.
- Launching development initiatives, such as scholarships and community programs, to support affected populations.
Effectively addressing historical injustices requires both symbolic and tangible actions. While apologies and memorials acknowledge past wrongs, meaningful justice can only be achieved through concrete legal and economic measures. A well-rounded approach that integrates recognition, reparation, and institutional reform is essential for strengthening national cohesion and restoring trust in governance.
Historical Justices
1. Ensure historic justice by providing compensation for the victims of Calii Canqoo, Calii Anoolee, and Calii Tuulama.
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- Unlike the other two, Calii Tuulama is not a singular event but an ongoing process that began during the Menelik era with the atrocities surrounding the formation of Finfinnee.
- This injustice persists to this day, with continued evictions carried out under the pretext of development.
- Addressing these historical wrongs requires both acknowledgment and tangible reparations to restore dignity to affected communities.
Freedom of speech and assembly
2. Guarantee basic freedom of speech and assembly with no repercussions and reaffirming this by legislation.
Justice for Atrocities Under PP Regime Watch
3. Release all political prisoners and compensate them for unjust imprisonments (the list can run into several thousands).
4. Justice for assassinated Oromos and compensation for their loved dependents (this can run into several hundreds, if itemized).
Language Status at Federal Level
5. Make Afan Oromo a federal working language.
City, Town, Zonal, Sub Regional, and Boundary Status
6. Resolve the Wallo issue.
7. Resolve the Finfinnee issue.
8. Resolve the Dire Dhawa issue.
9. Resolve the Harar issue
10. Resolve the Jijigaa issue.
11. Resolve the north Tuulama issue.
12. Resolve the Matakal and west Macaa issue.
13. Resolve the Moyale issue.
14. Resolve the Wando (what was renamed “Wando Genet”) issue
15. Resolve the various boundary issues (this can run into dozens if itemized).
Justice for Displaced and Killed People
16. Reinstate the 1.5M displaced Oromos from east Oromia.
17. Compensate those 10,000 killed victims and 1.5M displaced from east Oromia.
18. Reinstate those displaced Oromos from west Oromia (east Wallaga) (number to be updated).
19. Compensate those killed victims and displaced from west Oromia (east Wallaga) (number to be updated).
Internal Security
20. Demilitarize Oromia of federal forces and remove command posts.
21. Disband Oromia militia causing havoc, or have them properly trained to respect law and order and human rights.
Justice for Evicted and Being Evicted Farmers
22. Compensate evicted farmers in and around Shagger with stake-holding compensation in on-land investments.
23. Compensate evicted Tuulama Oromos elsewhere with stake-holding compensation in on-land investments.
24. Halt the Gadaa Super City project (Adama-Mojo) and reinstate the farmers being evicted.
Freedom of Worship
25. Legislate freedom of public worship of the traditional Oromo faith of Waqeefanna.
Protection of Oromia’s Resources
26. Protect Oromia’s resources including minerals and precious metals and investigate the corruption and thefts so far.
Justice for Environmental Victims
27. Compensate victims of environmental damage caused by a regime’s negligence, including poisoned rivers, lakes, and mining sites; damaged farmlands; and neglected care for hills and mountains affecting climate change. Justice must be served when compulsory environmental protection funds, provided by operating companies, are diverted by corrupt officials.
Pervasive Corruption in Commodities Control
28. Cease and desist from corrupt practices in commodities control (such as cement, chaat, sugar, and edible oil) by self-enriching regime officials, as these actions are detrimental to both personal and regional economies.
Party Political Offices
29. Open political offices shut in 2019-20.
Other Matters
30. The above list is by no means exhaustive. We’ll use this entry as a placeholder for new item(s) upon updates.
