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  1. Naming the Hand Behind the Fire: A Review of Tsegaye R. Ararssa’s Report on the Garrii–Borana Conflict in Moyale
    Diiqo Jaatani Aaga was thirteen years old when she was shot in Moyale on 18 October 2026, within hours of a flag being raised over an Oromo neighbourhood. Tsegaye R. Ararssa’s report begins with that flag and refuses to stop there. It follows the line from a single provocative ceremony back through two decades of dual administration, a failed referendum and a federal design that turned grazing commons into currencies of power, and forward to 50,000 people sheltering in schools, mosques and churches across the Kenyan border. It is the most complete account of the Moyale crisis yet published, and it deserves to be read well beyond the readership of Oromia Today.
    1. AN ACCOUNT THAT HOLDS EVENT AND HISTORY TOGETHER
    The report’s first achievement is discipline. Events are dated, places are named and casualty and displacement figures are attributed to UNHCR, IOM, the Kenya Department of Refugee Services, ACLED, hospital officials and the Red Cross. The sequence from the 18 October inauguration, through the barricades of 19–20 October, to the full-scale assault launched by Somali regional Special Forces on the night of 21 October is laid out with a clarity that leaves little room for the familiar fog of “clashes between communities”.
    Its second achievement is that the chronology never floats free of history. The reader is taken through the Anglo-Ethiopian demarcation of 1907, the constitutional architecture of 1995, the 2004 referendum and its 41 suspended kebeles, the collapsed April 2017 accord and the September 2017 violence that displaced more than 1.8 million people. By the time the report reaches October 2026, the flag-raising no longer looks like a spark. It looks like the predictable outcome of a structure built to produce exactly this.
    Ararssa also restores what conventional reporting erases: the tulaa wells of Goff, Lei and Waacille, the Gadaa system and Aadaa-Seera Boorana that governed shared access, the Xeer tradition on the Somali side, and the Abbaa Gadaas, Gurtii and cross-border women traders who have repeatedly kept the peace when the state did not. These are the institutions that worked. Placing them at the centre of the solution is the report’s quiet argument against every administration that set out to replace them.

    If the customary order once managed scarcity without massacre, the question becomes what changed, and who gained from changing it.
    2. NATURAL FRICTION AND ENGINEERED CONFLICT
    The report’s most important analytical move is its separation of two things that are routinely collapsed into one. Pastoralist communities sharing arid rangelands will compete over water and pasture. That competition is real, seasonal and, as the report shows, historically manageable through reciprocal access and elder mediation. It is not what produced mortar fire in Malab and Cammuq, or trenches dug along the Somali side of the road in the months before the attack.
    What produced those things is the conversion of territory into political and fiscal currency. Ararssa traces this to the EPRDF settlement of 1991, under which control of a kebele decided who could tax, appoint, deploy forces and claim parliamentary seats. His disclaimer on contested boundaries names the pattern directly: territorial misalignment and forcible acquisition tolerated by regional and federal authorities as an instrument of divide-and-rule.
    The report is equally clear that this did not end in 2018. Somali Regional State continued to create new zones and woredas in contested borderlands; its Liyu forces were built up while Oromia’s regional special force was disbanded in 2022, and Borana communities were placed under military surveillance on suspicion of supporting the OLA. The TPLF-led EPRDF engineered the fault line. The leadership that inherited the state after 2018 has kept it open. The machinery is the same; only the operators have changed. That is the hand behind the fire, disguised for three decades as an ancient feud between neighbours.

    An engineered conflict needs more than a state that looks away. It needs money, narratives and patrons, and the report follows them across the border.
    3. THE EXTERNAL MULTIPLIERS
    Section 7 of the report is where many readers will pause. Ararssa names northern Kenyan politicians, Farah Maalim and Dr Isaack Hassan among them, who mobilise ethnic solidarities across the international border, and records that political actors in northern Kenya have historically provided financial backing, sanctuary and rhetorical support to kin groups in Ethiopia. He then turns to Somali diaspora networks in North America, Europe and the Middle East, to activist media framing local administrative disputes as an existential war against “Oromo expansionism”, and to diaspora fundraising that has periodically channelled resources to local militias and prolonged their operational endurance.
    The value of this section lies in its synthesis. Taken one by one, these actors can each be presented as individually motivated nationalists voicing solidarity with kin. Read together, as the report presents them, they form a coordinated ecosystem of political patronage, media amplification and finance, operating across at least three continents and sustaining violence that local actors alone could not. Recognising that ecosystem is the first step to confronting it, and the report’s recommendation that Kenya restrain domestic political spillover from Marsabit and Mandera follows directly from it.

    Patrons and financiers explain why the fire keeps burning. They do not explain why those charged with putting it out have stood back.
    4. THE INCENTIVE BEHIND THE INDIFFERENCE
    Ararssa’s account of the federal response is unsparing: a conspicuous absence, a delayed military presence, a failure to establish a demilitarised buffer after the first ENDF intervention on 18 October, and an indifference that quietly favoured Somali forces. Inside Ethiopian Moyale, at the time of writing, Somali regional Special Forces remained in control.
    The report supplies the materials for explaining that indifference. Moyale is the overland gateway for a landlocked state of more than 120 million people, the anchor of the Mombasa–Nairobi–Finfinnee corridor and of LAPSSET, and a source of customs, livestock-export and transit revenue running to millions of dollars a month. Whoever controls its kebeles controls those flows.
    I would carry the author’s logic one step further. As Moyale matures into a supply line for refined petroleum moving north from Lamu, its value to the centre grows. A town made permanently ungovernable by two rival regional administrations becomes the ideal candidate for removal from both and placement under direct federal management. On that reading, the federal government’s passivity, and the muted response of the Oromia regional government, are not failures of capacity alone. They are consistent with an expectation of immediate financial and strategic return once the Borana are dislodged and the town is federalised. The report stops short of this conclusion. Its evidence points towards it, and it is a question that Oromo commentators, and the author himself, should press in future work.

    A diagnosis this exact demands a remedy addressed to those with the authority to act, and to those with the will to make them listen.
    5. RECOMMENDATIONS, AND WHO MUST CARRY THEM
    The report closes with a phased pathway: security stabilisation and humanitarian corridors in the first three months; a Joint Moyale Municipal Charter and pooled revenue-sharing within a year; and, over three years, a Joint Borana–Garrii Council of Elders governing grazing corridors and tulaa wells, backed by the IGAD Protocol on Transhumance. Its recommendations are addressed to the federal government, both regional administrations, the Government of Kenya, and international donors, UN agencies and IGAD. The demand to fully fund the $8.9 million emergency appeal, contain measles in the shelters and activate IGAD’s CEWARN mechanism with women peacebuilders at its centre is concrete, costed and achievable.
    I commend the author in particular for directing recommendations to international bodies. A report that addressed only Finfinnee would be a report addressed to a party to the problem.
    My one addition concerns delivery. Recommendations do not travel on their own. Oromo communities in the diaspora and in Oromia, through their civic associations, professional networks and community organisations, should take this report forward and place it formally before each body it names: UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, IOM, IGAD and CEWARN, the African Union, the Government of Kenya, donor governments and the diplomatic missions it was prepared for. Some of these bodies may not act. That is not a reason to stay silent. Formal submission creates a dated record that the facts were known, the risks were set out and the remedies were proposed. When the next flag is raised in Moyale, no one should be able to claim they were not told.
    For a revised edition, two small corrections would strengthen an already strong report. The displacement figures in the impact snapshot (Section 5.5) appear twice with conflicting dates (15,240 on 24 or 25 October; 36,000 on 25 October or 24 October/3 November) and should be reconciled. And Recommendation 11.2.3, which asks the federal government to convene a mediation forum but tasks the Oromia government with designing the charter, would read more clearly if the roles of the House of Federation and both regions were specified, consistent with Phase II.
    CONCLUSION
    Tsegaye R. Ararssa has done what the moment required: he has documented the crisis accurately, explained it historically and refused to let it be filed away as another pastoralist quarrel. His report shows that the violence in Moyale is not the failure of neighbours to share a well. It is the success of a political system that profits from their division. The task now falls to those who read it. Diiqo Jaatani Aaga’s death must enter the record of every institution that could have prevented the next one.

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