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  1. Fano did not emerge from nowhere, and it did not begin killing Oromo civilians by accident. On August 30, 2022, Amhara Fano militia entered Agamsa town in Horo Guduru Wollega and killed more than fifty-one Oromo civilians, part of a pattern that had already claimed thirty-seven lives in nearby Haro the previous October. Less than a month after Agamsa, the same militia struck Jarte Jardaga, killing more than fifty and displacing thousands. In November 2022, Fano returned to Kiremu district and killed a district court judge along with dozens of residents. In December of that year, video circulated showing Fano fighters posing with the decapitated heads of people they labeled “Shane,” while allied forces executed twenty more civilians in Hanger Gutin. By September 2025, a single day’s raid in the same Horo Guduru corridor had killed more than thirty people and displaced over six thousand.

    This is not incidental violence attached to an ideology. It is the ideology’s logical terminus.

    The ERI essay identifies, correctly, a rhetorical progression: fear produces anxiety, anxiety produces resistance, resistance hardens into contempt. What that essay leaves as a psychological observation, Western Oromia has lived as a body count. The “irrational fear of Oromo political ownership” catalogued as ERI’s sixth tenet does not stay contained in podcasts and op-eds. It arms itself. Fano’s own recruitment logic borrows directly from the ERI grammar of geographic dispossession and demographic threat, translating the abstract claim that Oromo self-government threatens non-Oromo Ethiopians into a concrete campaign against the villages, farms, and administrators of Horo Guduru and East Wollega. A Fano commander’s leaked declaration that Oromia would become the group’s “battlefield” is not a departure from ERI’s ideological premises. It is what those premises sound like once they stop being argued and start being enforced.

    The Ethiopian state’s posture compounds the ideological point rather than complicating it. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed publicly called Fano “a source of pride for the Amhara people and Ethiopia as a whole” in July 2022, weeks before Agamsa. Federal forces have since been repeatedly accused of vacating towns just ahead of Fano’s arrival and of tolerating, where they have not actively enabled, a militia operating deep inside another region’s constitutionally recognized territory. This is restorationism’s institutional face: a state that will not name Fano as what residents and the Oromo Liberation Army have called it, a campaign of ethnic violence against Oromo civilians, because doing so would require confronting the same territorial and hierarchical assumptions the ERI essay spends its length dismantling in the abstract.

    The essay asks what a non-Oromo Finfinnee resident stands to lose from Oromo constitutional recognition, and answers: nothing enforceable, nothing legitimate. Western Oromia supplies the dark twin of that answer. What Oromo residents of Horo Guduru and East Wollega have lost defending against that same restorationist anxiety is not hypothetical — it is mass graves, millions displaced, a judge murdered in his own district. The zero-sum premise ERI treats as a rhetorical error is, on this ground, a body count. Naming the ideology is necessary. Naming its armed wing, and the state that shields it, is what makes the naming matter.

  2. Commendation is due to the Oromia Today Editorial team for a rigorous and intellectually compelling critique of the ENDC-organised platform’s attempt to legitimise ERI under the guise of national consensus. In extending that framework, it is the drivers of this ideologue that require naming, not the ideology alone.
    Chief among those drivers is the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which has functioned as an institutional harbour for revisionist ideology rather than a neutral custodian of faith. The comparison with the Serbian Orthodox Church is instructive, and sobering. There, the fusion of church and national identity — rooted in the medieval Nemanjić dynasty and the Kosovo myth, but deliberately intensified through the twentieth century — did not remain a matter of symbolism. By the time of the 600th anniversary commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1989, church and state nationalism had merged so completely on the public stage that the church became an active participant in the ethnic mobilisation that helped drive Yugoslavia’s disintegration into war. The lesson is not that religion alone causes conflict, but that a church which fuses itself with one people’s national narrative forfeits its capacity to hold a multiethnic state together — and can instead become one of the institutions that pulls it apart. Ethiopia, with its own unresolved multinational settlement, cannot treat that precedent as merely academic. The Church of England was deliberately severed from Rome so that religious authority could serve the English crown’s political interests rather than a supranational one. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has played a comparable role, fusing itself with Amhara-Ethiopian imperial identity until the two became, in the popular imagination, one and the same. Beyond the church, this ideology is sustained through education, the arts, the designation of a national language, theatre, and cultural shows at home and in the diaspora — which is why an average person in Europe, Africa or the Caribbean instinctively associates Ethiopian identity with Amharic speech and Orthodox Christianity, and finds it hard to accept that other identities exist just as fully.
    The clearest recent proof of the church’s active role was the protest staged across Europe against Oromo Orthodox Christians seeking a church service in Afaan Oromo, laying bare the gap between the church and the revisionist current. I agree that despite the fall of the monarchy in 1974, the institutions sustaining this ideologue remained intact. Revisionists still see Afaan Oromo in schools as a threat to national unity — meaning Ethio-Amhara elite identity — which is why Amhara Fano’s strategic objective is to restore the unitary state. Across Europe, the church banner is displayed alongside the imperial flag rather than the crucifix most Christians identify with, confirming the institution’s self-presentation is as political as it is devotional.
    Those aligned with ERI have been here since 1974 and will keep contesting every step, demonising the Oromo and others in their way, even under a different political banner. But the institutions that produce and sustain the ideology — church, classroom, stage, cultural hall — will remain the same. It is imperative to put the imperial machinery and its institutions behind us if Ethiopia is to continue as a coherent country.

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