What Does the Demand “Remove Article 39” Really Mean?

The Dangerous Misunderstanding at the Heart of Ethiopia’s Constitutional Debate

Few constitutional provisions in modern Ethiopia provoke as much emotional reaction, ideological hostility, and political anxiety as Article 39 of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution [1,2,3].

For some, it is portrayed as a dangerous clause that threatens national unity. For others, it is one of the few constitutional guarantees protecting the dignity and political security of the nations and peoples incorporated into the Ethiopian state.

Yet one fundamental question is rarely asked clearly enough:

What does the demand to “remove Article 39” actually mean in practice?

Because beneath the slogans and political rhetoric lies a far deeper issue — one that touches the very nature of coexistence, consent, legitimacy, and the future of multinational Ethiopia itself.

This is not merely a legal debate.

It is a philosophical debate about whether nations should coexist voluntarily or compulsorily.

And that distinction changes everything.

Article 39 Is Not Just About Secession

One of the biggest misconceptions surrounding Article 39 is the assumption that it exists primarily to encourage separation.

That is an oversimplification.

The essence of Article 39 is not separation. Its essence is consent.

The article recognizes that the nations and peoples within Ethiopia are not merely administrative populations under a centralized state, but political communities with collective rights, including the ultimate right to determine their own political destiny if coexistence becomes impossible.

In that sense, Article 39 functions less as a “divorce mechanism” and more as a constitutional acknowledgment that unity must continuously justify itself through fairness, trust, equality, and mutual benefit.

It says something profoundly modern:

No nation should be permanently trapped in a political arrangement against its will.

That principle may discomfort centralists and imperial nostalgists, but in the 21st century it is increasingly aligned with modern democratic legitimacy.

Article 39 as a Constitutional Safety Valve

Perhaps the simplest way to understand Article 39 is to see it as a constitutional safety valve.

Safety valves are rarely used.

But their existence prevents catastrophic pressure buildup.

That is precisely their purpose.

The psychology behind Article 39 is remarkably important:

If nations know they cannot be permanently imprisoned within a political system, coexistence becomes psychologically easier.

If an exit exists, unity becomes something that must be earned rather than imposed.

The state cannot rely solely on force, mythology, fear, or historical domination to preserve itself.

Paradoxically, the existence of Article 39 may actually reduce the likelihood of separation because it lowers existential fear.

People are often more willing to stay in a house when they know the door is not locked from outside.

That psychological dimension is critically misunderstood by many opponents of the article.

The Airplane Emergency Exit Metaphor

Perhaps the most simplistic and accessible metaphor is this:

Article 39 is like the emergency exit in an airplane.

Passengers board an airplane because they trust the journey.

Nobody boards because they plan to jump out.

But imagine an airline announcing:

“We are removing all emergency exits because we believe passengers should never leave the plane.”

Would passengers feel reassured?

Or terrified?

The very act of sealing the exits would immediately create suspicion and panic.

Passengers would naturally begin asking:

• Why are they afraid of giving us an escape route?
• What are they planning?
• Why must we be trapped?
• Is this still a voluntary journey?

Ironically, removing the emergency exit would make passengers think more seriously about escaping.

And that is precisely the contradiction embedded in the campaign against Article 39.

The clause itself may rarely be exercised, but abolishing it fundamentally changes the psychological nature of coexistence.

It transforms partnership into confinement.

Who Really Opposes Article 39?

The opposition to Article 39 generally emerges from political and ideological currents that view Ethiopia primarily as:

• a singular ancient civilization-state,
• an indivisible national identity,
• or a centralized political project threatened by multinational federalism.

For such groups, Article 39 symbolizes:

• fragmentation,
• instability,
• weakening of centralized authority,
• and the possible dissolution of the empire-state structure historically inherited.

From this perspective, the clause is viewed almost like a permanent constitutional “loaded gun.”

But nations and peoples who historically experienced:

• forced assimilation,
• cultural suppression,
• language marginalization,
• political exclusion,
• land dispossession,
• and centralized domination

often see Article 39 very differently.

• For them, it is not primarily about separation. It is about protection against domination.
• It is about constitutional recognition that coexistence must ultimately rest on consent rather than coercion.

The Deep Irony Behind the Campaign Against Article 39

There is a profound irony that many fail to recognize.

Those demanding the removal of Article 39 often claim they are defending “national unity.”

Yet history repeatedly shows that coercive unity tends to produce the exact opposite:

• mistrust,
• resentment,
• radicalization,
• resistance,
• and eventually fragmentation.

• Voluntary unity is almost always stronger than enforced unity.
• When people feel respected, secure, and constitutionally protected, they are more willing to coexist.
• When people feel trapped, they begin imagining escape.

This is why the campaign against Article 39 can unintentionally revive separatist thinking even among groups that may not have seriously entertained it before.

A nation willing to coexist under guarantees may reconsider everything once those guarantees are threatened.

That is the political danger many fail to appreciate.

The Marriage Versus Captivity Metaphor

Another simple but powerful metaphor is marriage.

• A healthy marriage survives because both partners are free to leave.
• The freedom to leave gives meaning to the decision to stay.

If one partner suddenly declares:

“You no longer have the right to leave this marriage,”

the relationship fundamentally changes.

It ceases to be genuine partnership and starts resembling captivity.

Likewise, Article 39 gives multinational coexistence an element of consent.

Removing it risks transforming coexistence into compulsion.

And no political arrangement built on fear of entrapment can sustain genuine trust indefinitely.

The Thermometer Metaphor: A Profound Misdiagnosis

Perhaps the most important conceptual misunderstanding is this:

• Many opponents speak as though Article 39 created Ethiopia’s national question.
• But Article 39 did not create the problem!
• It emerged because the problem already existed.

This distinction is crucial.

Article 39 is not the cause of instability.

It is the constitutional acknowledgment of historical instability.

It recognizes that Ethiopia’s nations and peoples entered modern constitutional arrangements carrying long memories of:

• conquest,
• forced incorporation,
• denied identities,
• unequal power structures,
• and historical grievances.

In that sense, abolishing Article 39 would resemble smashing a thermometer because one dislikes the fever reading.

Removing the thermometer does not cure the illness.

It merely blinds society to the underlying condition.

Likewise, removing constitutional recognition of self-determination does not erase the national question.

It may instead intensify it.

The Foundational Question the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission Cannot Escape

One cannot help but wonder:

How central is Article 39 of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution within the discussions of the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) [4]?

Because if national dialogue is meant to address the foundational questions of the Ethiopian state, then surely no question is more foundational than this:

• Is the Ethiopian political arrangement ultimately voluntary or compulsory?

That is precisely the question Article 39 attempts to answer constitutionally.

One may disagree with the article. One may fear its implications. One may even advocate revising aspects of it.

But can a meaningful national dialogue genuinely avoid confronting the underlying historical realities that produced it in the first place?

After all, Article 39 did not emerge from political fantasy.

It emerged from generations of unresolved national questions, contested state formation, forced incorporations, cultural suppressions, and struggles over dignity, identity, language, land, and political power.

If the ENDC merely discusses coexistence without confronting whether that coexistence is rooted in genuine consent, then many may reasonably ask:

What exactly is being dialogued about?

Why the Debate Feels Historically Regressive

Many people are genuinely bewildered by the intensity of efforts to remove Article 39.

Because from a modern democratic perspective, the demand can appear historically regressive.

Empires historically survived through:

• military force,
• centralized monarchies,
• imposed identities,
• suppression,
• and coercive assimilation.

But the modern world increasingly derives legitimacy from:

• consent,
• negotiated coexistence,
• pluralism,
• constitutional recognition,
• and democratic inclusion.

The 21st century is fundamentally different from the age of imperial consolidation.

Attempting to maintain multinational unity by denying nations the right to self-determination may therefore appear less like nation-building and more like an attempt to revive outdated imperial logic under modern terminology.

That is why many observers view the campaign against Article 39 not as a solution, but as a form of political self-sabotage.

Destroying the constitutional safety valve may destabilize the very coexistence it claims to protect.

The Psychological Genius of Article 39

Ironically, one could argue that Article 39 may have helped preserve Ethiopia more than its opponents realize.

Because it reassures nations that coexistence is not a prison sentence.

That reassurance matters enormously.

Human beings — and nations — psychologically tolerate difficulty far better when they know they retain agency and dignity.

A locked political structure generates fear.

A voluntary structure generates trust.

That distinction is foundational.

And perhaps this is why the demand to abolish Article 39 alarms so many people.

Not necessarily because they seek separation, but because they fear what the removal symbolizes: the return of compulsory political subordination.

The Question That Must Be Asked

Ultimately, the debate forces one unavoidable question:

• If coexistence is truly beneficial, just, and fair, why fear the existence of a constitutional exit?
• Why should unity depend on denying people the theoretical right to leave?

Strong unions do not fear consent. Only fragile arrangements fear voluntary choice.

Conclusion: The Right to Stay Matters More When the Right to Leave Exists

Nations rarely fear voluntary coexistence.

What they fear is irreversible political imprisonment.

Article 39 may not guarantee separation, but it guarantees something equally important: dignity.

It guarantees the principle that coexistence must ultimately rest on consent rather than coercion.

And perhaps that guarantee, more than anything else, is what has made multinational Ethiopia psychologically possible for so many nations in the first place.

The tragedy is that many who seek to abolish Article 39 believe they are strengthening unity.

They may in fact be weakening the very trust upon which durable unity depends.

Because people who know they are free to leave are often the very people most willing to stay.

References

1. Article 39 of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution, An Excerpt, OROMIA TODAY.
2. Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (official consolidated English text), (Article 39 appears on page 21 and is titled “The Right of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples to Self‑Determination), Ethiopian Embassy, Brussels, Belgium.
3. Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, “Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution on secession and self‑determination: a panacea to the nationality question in Africa?”, published in Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ 31, 1998, pp. 440–455).
4. OT Editorial,  To the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission: You Are Wasting Your Time and Everyone Else’s, 31 January 2025, OROMIA TODAY.
5. Yadessa Guma, Peaceful Divorce, Shared Future, 4 November 2025, OROMIA TODAY.